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T

he Army exists to win the nation’s wars. That is and always should be its
principal mission. The Army’s transformation White Paper, “Concepts of
the Objective Force,” states, “The Army must remain optimized for major theater
war,”1 with the presumption that this theater of war is overseas. But the Army has
other priorities as well. The preamble to the Constitution tells us that among our
founding principles, our government exists to “insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity.” This statement of existential
purpose implies a domestic emphasis—that we must be prepared to fight significantly different kinds of wars from what we think of today. Even after 11 September 2001, the modern concept of war for most American soldiers is something
that is fought elsewhere for national security reasons, does not directly affect domestic safety, and does not affect the lives of the average citizens (other than our
national preoccupation with 24-hour news stations). Yet homeland security is
now a major focus of the nation, the Administration, and Congress, and the Army
will play a major role in it.
This new security situation, dominated not just by the need to project
exceptionally lethal force overseas, but also to assist in homeland security, will
force change on the military. While once a significant mission of the Army, protecting US citizens from attacks at home has not been a major concern for generations, and the Army has not organized or actively planned for this mission in
recent memory. Yet the events of 11 September 2001 have caused us to recognize
that many of the asymmetric attacks we prepare to confront in distant combat
36

Parameters

zones also can be perpetrated against our citizens at home. Homeland security is
once again a front-burner issue for the nation.
From a formal policy perspective, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) arguably made homeland defense the Department of Defense’s primary mission, and the QDR report states that “preparing for homeland security
may require changes in force structure and organization.”2 For over a century and
a half, from the formation of the nation until World War II, defending the nationproper from foreign or domestic attack was arguably the primary mission of the
Army.3 Strategists, primarily outside the Pentagon, are once again focusing on
the military’s role in homeland security, with such issues as the control, composition, and missions of the National Guard receiving significant attention.4
Juxtaposed to this, almost the entire focus within DOD before 9/11 was
on changing the structure, doctrine, equipment, and supporting institutional
functions of the military—what the Army used to call DTLOMS and the joint
community now calls DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel,
Leadership, Personnel, and Facilities)—through a process called transformation, with the purpose of being better able to fight future wars in faraway places.5
Since 9/11 this has not changed substantially. For the Army, the ability to project
transformed power to distant theaters of war is the major focus. Additionally, the
Objective Force concepts for fighting future wars envision nonlinear battlefields, significantly faster operational tempo (optempo) and speed on the battlefield, nearly omniscient commanders and forces with a “god’s eye” view of the
battlefield based on almost perfect intelligence, and more sophisticated technology, including the expanded use of robotics.
These two strategic focuses create institutional forces—transformation
and homeland security—which will drive change in the Army. To date, indications are that they are being considered separately, without regard for their interactions or the realization that, together, they define the military capabilities
needed in the new security environment.
In this article, I briefly examine each and discuss how they affect expectations and capabilities, using the DOTMLPF model as a template. Each of the
DOTMLPF areas deserves a full and detailed analysis, but that is beyond the
scope of this article. Instead, I’ll briefly consider each and propose likely de-
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mands and circumstances which, if realized, will force the Army to modify some
DOTMLPF components. As with any effort to predict the future, some of these
changes may not be realized. In particular, my hope is that this article will help
the Army recognize and anticipate potential problems, make wise choices, and
contribute to avoiding potential mistakes that would detract from the nation’s
ability to concurrently defend the homeland and further our national security interests overseas.

Preview of Recommendations and Conclusion
This article presents arguments designed to show that military transformation, in its essence, is the act of changing the shape and functions of the military to meet the challenges of the future security environment. As originally
foreseen, this involves using advances in technology to make possible heretofore
unheard-of capabilities for projecting power and fighting enemies on future battlefields. Yet it is now clear that a critical component of future security situations
will be homeland security. The transformation process should be rethought in
this context. Transformation must explicitly include the demands of homeland
security as a key component so that all DOTMLPF implications are examined holistically and the transformed force can accomplish all missions demanded of it
by the National Command Authorities.
Some simple observations and conclusions, organized along the
DOTMLPF categories, make it clear that a holistic approach is needed. They
tell us:
l Doctrinal changes for homeland security and transformation will
appear mutually exclusive at face value, but will have significant implications
for training, leader development, organization, and personnel support that affect
both missions.
l The training burdens of transformation and homeland security may
be significantly different and to some extent divergent. Reserve component
units, with limited available time, will find it difficult if not impossible to train
well for both missions, making it necessary to seriously consider designating
separate units for homeland security missions and warfighting.
l The leader development demands of homeland security and transformation will appear different in form, but may be substantially similar in character. Both will place a premium on intellectual capability, maturity, and the ability
to act appropriately without explicit direction.
l The training demands outlined above; the needs of governors for
trained, well-led, and appropriately organized forces to defend against terrorist
threats; and possible political pressures to not deploy some Army National Guard
(ARNG) units during times of heightened terrorist threats may demand a fundamental reexamination of Army organization. End-strength levels may also
be affected.
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l Materiel development and facilities requirements will not be significantly affected by the homeland security/transformation divergence.
l Personnel issues—in this case primarily soldier and family support
issues—will be of increased importance in both the homeland security and transformation frameworks, and will require a focused examination to determine specific needs.

Homeland Security, Briefly
Before 9/11, the role of the military in response to domestic incidents
was articulated in DOD Directives 3025.1, Military Support to Civil Authorities;
3025.12, Military Assistance for Civil Disturbances; and 3025.15, Military Assistance to Civil Authorities. The Secretary of the Army was designated as the
DOD Executive Agent in recognition of the fact that the majority of support
would come from the Army, and in almost every case government policy envisioned military formations supporting a domestic lead federal agency. The
unwritten Army policy was that forces organized, trained, and equipped for overseas conflicts could handle these missions without significant additional training
or preparation.
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 brought to the attention of the American
people and leaders a threat that had been developing for some time. In the aftermath of this disaster, many efforts were undertaken—most are still developing—
to better prepare the nation to face threats of this nature across a spectrum of actions from preparation, through deterrence, detection, prevention, and response,
to recovery and reconstitution. The President established the Office of Homeland
Security (now the Homeland Security Council Staff), Congress established the
Department of Homeland Security, and each state established some office to plan
for and coordinate homeland security efforts, or gave that task to an existing office in the state government.6 These organizations focused initially on issues requiring immediate response, but they are now looking further out and developing
strategies for their efforts.7 Internal and external investigations were and are being conducted to determine what went wrong with intelligence functions and
government preparations. It can be safely asserted that homeland security
thought, organization, and preparedness have begun to mature, but must still
progress before they can be viewed as fully developed.
On the military side, the President established Northern Command
(NORTHCOM) in October 2002 as the first-ever combatant command with an
area of responsibility that includes the North American continent.8 NORTHCOM
will be the principal point of contact for military support during homeland defense
and security operations for active and federalized forces. Its missions, as described
by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Verga, will be in three areas:
[1] Traditional military missions performed inside the United States, called “extraordinary circumstances.” [Examples] would be the current combat air patrols,
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during which military aircraft might be ordered to shoot down a terrorist-hijacked
airliner that’s en route to a target. [2] Emergency circumstances, where the military
aids civil authorities or other federal agencies with logistical and other support in,
for instance, disaster relief missions after hurricanes, tornadoes, and floods. [3]
Temporary circumstances, such as DOD support to the Olympics.9

At the department level, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a 1 July 2002 memorandum, changed much of this organization and authority by giving the lead role
for domestic disturbances to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict and Homeland Defense Policy. The Defense
Authorization Act of 2002 created the position of Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Homeland Defense (ASD/HD), and DOD transferred these functions as well
as the functions previously performed by the Directorate of Military Support
(DOMS) to the Office of the ASD/HD.10 The Office of the ASD/HD is new, and
NORTHCOM is not yet at full operating capacity, but both will be taking on these
responsibilities in FY 03.
The Army’s role in homeland security is also evolving.11 Some specific
roles for which it must prepare are captured in doctrine and plans, but other significant tasks are not and are determined instead by experience, research, and
history. National Guard troops were called upon to perform many manpowerintensive duties following 9/11, some more meaningful than others.12 But of equal
importance are those they were not called upon to perform, due to the singular nature of the events.13 Army National Guard forces were used extensively in security
efforts initiated after the attacks, but not significantly in the response to the attacks
themselves. Future attacks in areas less well prepared than New York or Washington, or attacks that involve chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or enhanced explosive (CBRNE) devices, would implicate a larger and more comprehensive response by the military in general, and the Army in particular.

Homeland Security Implications
This section and a later section on transformation implications address
issues related to the likely changes in DOTMLPF areas. The elements are discussed slightly out of order, considering leader issues directly after training,
since those factors are related.
Of importance is a likely, though indirect, increased demand for Army
National Guard units. Almost any foreseeable overseas contingency in the near
future outside of the Korean Peninsula will involve conflict in areas with large
Muslim populations, creating a heightened threat of terrorist attack from Islamist
terrorists in response to US military action. While any such situation will likely
not take the form of a military attack on American soil that would require forces
to engage an enemy in combat, and need not even involve an actual attack, it
would likely tie up significant components of the National Guard. Merely the increased likelihood of terror attacks and the requisite and likely prolonged in40
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crease in the Homeland Security Advisory System threat levels will place a
significant burden on state governments.14 Protection of critical infrastructures
such as airports, dams, nuclear generating facilities, and chemical plants will be
first-order issues for the nation’s governors. Manpower will be at a premium, and
the National Guard is the primary source of readily available, trained, organized,
and well-led emergency manpower for the nation’s governors. Should another
major terrorist attack occur within the United States, the Army should expect that
governors will not willingly acquiesce to their National Guard forces being deployed overseas during contingencies, and might appeal to the President should
they be mobilized. Should this situation occur, combatant commanders must be
prepared to change operations plans that rely heavily on National Guard units.15
In the longer term, other, more fundamental changes must be considered, some of
which are discussed below.
Doctrine is being developed for homeland security operations, with an
emphasis on working as part of a multi-agency team that includes federal, state, local, and private-sector organizations. At the federal level, the military will almost
never be the lead federal agency in response operations that fall outside the traditional military role articulated by Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Verga
above, and will be directed by an “on-scene commander” from a civilian agency.16
When deployed, they will likely fall under the command of NORTHCOM, but
NORTHCOM will not run the operation. The National Guard forces under state
active duty or Title 32 status may be given independent roles, such as securing a
physical site to prevent terrorist attacks, but also will work in coordination with
and perhaps under the direction of other state organizations (e.g., the state police or
emergency management agencies). These nonmilitary operational modes will demand new doctrine to guide training and planning.
As the homeland security requirements of the states increase, the organization of the Army and indeed all military forces will need to be reexamined.17
The organization of the Army National Guard in particular—what type of units
are in the Guard, and where they are located—will almost certainly be called into
question. It could be proposed that National Guard units organize and train to
meet the governors’ homeland security needs. This would imply that the mix of
unit types in the ARNG and US Army Reserve (USAR) should be reexamined to
consider providing more combat support and combat service support units in the
Guard for homeland security missions. Likely candidates would include military
police, chemical,18 medical, ordnance, and other units that traditionally fall in the
USAR, as well as the more traditional infantry units for security operations. Governors might find tank and artillery battalions, for example, less useful than these
other units as they plan to respond to terrorist activities or threats.
Training efforts will create readiness issues for the Army, in that Army
leaders will have to make decisions on how much training time to devote to traditional and transformation “warfighting” areas versus homeland security areas
(e.g., civil support missions). Reserve component units, in particular, will find
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“A critical component of future security situations
will be homeland security. The transformation
process should be rethought in this context.”

competing demands for training to be difficult to handle as they anticipate
homeland security missions and seek to prepare for them. With very limited
training time, and the requirement for Army units involved in homeland security
to work effectively with civilian agencies at various levels of government, their
challenge will be particularly difficult to meet. Indeed, the Gilmore Commission’s most recent report states,
The Panel is concerned that there is no assurance that specially-trained forces will
be available to NORTHCOM prior to a crisis, and that current civil support training
across the armed forces in general is insufficient. . . .
The problem has been that insufficient attention has been paid to and resources
made available for civil support training. We now know the pervasiveness of the
threat, the increased probabilities of terrorist acts, and the need for enhanced preparation for effective response. Therefore, the Advisory Panel suggests a significant
increase in the emphasis on civil support missions for all hazards incidents, with
special emphasis on response to acts of terror. Specifically, the Department of Defense should increase the planning, training, and exercising of Active, Guard, and
Reserve forces to execute civil support missions.19

This conflict in training demands will be made more acute by likely increases in
the frequency and content of homeland security exercises in the near future.20
Leader skills for homeland defense will likely be different from those
currently developed by the Army. While strong leaders who can train and lead
military units will remain a consistent requirement, the need to work with state
and local agencies, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and the press will
create a new set of skills not previously required (or at least not prominently required below the general officer level). Leaders will need to understand not only
that in most cases the Army will be a support agency, but also that they will frequently not be the experts in the circumstances they encounter (e.g., local leaders
will know the area, understand the people, and understand the mission better than
any federal agency could). An added appreciation for civilian counterparts, and
sensitivity to public opinion and political considerations, will, as a minimum,
need to be part of the makeup of commanders and other leaders in homeland security situations—skills not currently cultivated.
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The Army’s materiel and facilities requirements for homeland defense
would not be significantly different in kind than for future combat, but will likely
be different in mix. Specifically, instead of materiel to support high optempo
warfighting concepts, homeland security will require small arms weaponry,
corps of engineers and medical equipment and supplies, and items needed for
CBRNE operations. It is unlikely that any major new items would need to be developed or supplied for such operations, but stockage levels will have to be adjusted for changes in mission and organization.
Personnel support issues will likely be of great importance, particularly
in the reserve components. Increased time in active service performing homeland security missions will put a strain on the reserve components (primarily the
Guard), and cause a continued realignment of who is willing to serve in what type
of positions. Reserve component soldiers who earn significantly more in their
civilian jobs than in the Army will find it difficult to make the commitment. Civilian employers may find it increasingly difficult to do without reserve component soldiers who are frequently deployed, a particularly acute problem for those
who employ soldiers in high-demand, low-density specialties. Civilian career
progression may also be adversely affected by increasing time on active duty.
Family support activities will be of increased importance, as will organized preparation of soldiers and families for prolonged duty and separation. This list of
possible considerations is brief, but continued analysis and attention from Army
leaders is needed.
This illustrative collection of likely DOTMLPF demands made by the
homeland security mission implies a certain strategic approach. Decisions may
need to be made on organization and missions if the Army is to meet its commitments under current and future war plans, while supporting federal and state
homeland defense missions. The Defense Department, in conjunction with state
governors, may need to designate units that will not be permitted to deploy during certain contingencies, and active and USAR units may similarly need to be
considered. The mix of forces in USAR and ARNG units may need to be examined, and the authorized level of organization (ALO) of units may have to be reconsidered to ensure that homeland security-oriented units are sufficiently
manned to accomplish their missions, at the same time that enough soldiers are
made available for overseas contingencies. These changes might also imply a reexamination of the active/reserve component mix, to provide more readily available assets of appropriate types for the governors and combatant commanders.
Any such effort, however, should be undertaken with the explicit acknowledgment of the 1973 philosophy elucidated by then-Army Chief of Staff Creighton
Abrams: that the reserve components must be an integral part of the go-to-war
Army, so that any decision to commit American troops would necessarily involve the active participation of the whole nation. Operations plans and contingency plans will need to be reexamined to determine if sufficient forces exist to
execute them given the likely demands of homeland security; if not, adjustments
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to structure and end strength will need to be considered.21 The Army’s mix of military occupational specialties will also need to be reexamined in light of the force
structure changes and governors’ likely concerns outlined above. Finally, these
and other changes have implications for Army institutions and investment strategies in general.

Transformation, Briefly
Army transformation is contained in the larger DOD transformation effort,22 in which a premium has been placed on strategic mobility, smart weaponry,
and optimizing forces to fight very high-tempo engagements that rely on speed,
precision, communications, intelligence, lethality, and seamless coordination
across the joint force. DOD’s focus is not primarily on ground forces, but on
smart weapons, space-based systems, C4I capabilities23 that can be used to synchronize and “leverage” the capabilities of the entire force, and technologies and
practices that have improved potential for increased lethality, survivability, and
manpower savings. The forces of all services are being integrated to a greater degree than ever before, and in many ways technology is replacing manpower as the
capabilities of the individual warrior, team, unit, and joint force are expanded.
For the Army, transformation is largely embodied by the Objective
Force organization and concepts under development.24 These concepts envision
technology that will permit significant increases in strategic mobility, made possible by the 16- to 20-ton vehicles that will replace tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, self-propelled artillery pieces, and many other items of equipment, without
sacrificing lethality or survivability. This will, in theory, permit deployment by
air of a sizable portion of an early entry force.25 Furthermore, tactical and operational employment concepts envision a nonlinear battlefield in which nearperfect intelligence, robots, and extremely capable information networks allow
the Objective Force to move extremely fast, and to “see first, understand first, act
first, and finish decisively” to overwhelm enemies before they can react.26 These
capabilities will rely not only on sophisticated communications and intelligence
technologies, but on large numbers of robots and the automation of many functions currently performed by soldiers.
The Objective Force, as envisioned, would fight in a significantly different manner than traditional, industrial-age forces. According to developing
Objective Force doctrine, near-perfect intelligence, automation and robotics,
smart munitions, and greatly increased C4I capabilities will result in a nonlinear battlefield making possible greatly increased freedom of movement. This
will permit units to operate without rigid boundaries or rear areas, allowing
them to attack the enemy from the direction and with the elements of combat
power most likely to produce swift and overwhelming victory.27 This revolutionary concept has significant implications for every aspect of the Objective
Force, from the equipment and unit organization that will be required to support
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“Reserve component units, in particular,
will find competing demands for training
to be difficult to handle.”

this type of warfare, to the training and leadership skills needed for every soldier on the battlefield.
To make all this work, Objective Force commanders, leaders, and soldiers will be critical components of this system. In many ways, technological advances will reduce the requirement for soldiers and leaders to understand large
amounts of mechanical information and procedures. This requirement will be replaced by other technical skills. The ability of every soldier on the battlefield to
understand his surroundings and his commander’s intent, and to act accordingly,
is important today, but it will be much more important in this more fluid and less
rigidly controlled environment.28 Indeed, the maturity and amount of initiative
that will be required not only of leaders, but of every soldier on the future battlefield, will dictate a very different set of skills and demand changes in the Army
leader development processes.29
One implication of this is that the soldier of the future will need additional skills to fight as an effective member of the transformed force. Intellectual
and leadership skills will be at a premium, and numeric manpower requirements
are likely to decline or at most remain stable. The envisioned battle space an
Objective Force “division” will traverse and dominate will be orders of magnitude greater than today.30

Transformation Implications
As indicated by the Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)
“the areas of doctrine, training, and leader development will constitute the preponderance of the transformation effort,” yet there also will be effects on other aspects
of DOTMLPF, and independent effects as well.31 The following paragraphs briefly
address some of these areas, and note the likely implications of the changes made
necessary by the homeland security missions outlined above.
Significant work has taken place at the Training and Doctrine Command
to begin developing the doctrine required to fight the Objective Force, but these efforts also recognize the need for increased flexibility and responsiveness in the
doctrinal development process, to better respond to the quickly changing needs of
the operational Army.32 Significantly, these efforts have focused almost exclusively on future combat. Of general interest, this doctrine must also mesh within
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the joint doctrinal framework, and while joint doctrine for warfighting is mature in
content and process, for homeland security it is not. The doctrinal development
process will force consideration of both transformation and homeland security in
the Army and joint communities. Care must be given to ensure that these separate
statements of doctrine take into account the differing requirements they will place
on the force and for the other elements of DOTMLPF.
The organization of some Objective Force units is currently being finalized in anticipation of an upcoming Milestone B decision for the Future Combat
System (FCS) in 2003.33 Lower-level units will contain combined-arms elements
to integrate those capabilities thought to be essential for the fast-tempo, nonlinear battlefield of the future. As an isolated matter, this has no bearing on homeland defense, but as stated in the Objective Force White Paper, deploying forces
are envisioned to include ARNG, USAR, and active component elements. In
light of the requirements of homeland security outlined above, the issue of unit
missions, the availability of units and individuals, and even what type of units exist in each component must be explicitly addressed.
The far greater intellectual and leadership demands placed on soldiers
in Objective Force units will have significant training implications. In general,
the more complicated the task of an organization, the greater the skills required
of organizations and their members, and so the greater the training burden. The
added complications of the nonlinear battlefield will be heightened by the integration of combined arms at lower organization levels, and by the requirement
for small Objective Force units to fight as part of the joint team.34 In the Objective
Force, these greater requirements will fall predominantly on leaders, but in combat all must be prepared to step up into leadership roles.
Great training emphasis will be placed on developing leader and team capabilities, and exemplary competence at all levels will be needed for success.
Training aids and simulators are likely to be embedded in Objective Force equipment, and there will likely be a strong emphasis on broadening skill sets and tactical proficiency.35 These aids will save time and ease the training burden, but the
time and resource demands of training to meet these new mission requirements
have yet to be determined. However, one thing is clear. The training required for
units to fight in the nonlinear, joint, and dynamic battlefield envisioned for the Objective Force will be greater than it is currently. Juxtaposed with this increased
training requirement for transformation is the increase called for by the Gilmore
Commission in civil support (and other homeland security) training. It should be
noted that while the training tasks required of individual soldiers may not differ
significantly in kind between many Objective Force and homeland security missions (e.g., guarding a facility or driving a vehicle would be the same in both
cases), the unit tasks and the emphasis on tasks could differ significantly (e.g.,
communications and intelligence-related tasks in the case of the Objective Force
versus patrolling with local police in the case of homeland security). These competing demands will be particularly difficult for reserve component units to meet.
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As mentioned earlier, leaders and soldiers in the Objective Force will
be expected to act with greater autonomy, maturity, and knowledge than at any
time in the past. The nonlinear battlefield and advanced technology envisioned
imply that units will cover much larger areas, and independent action will be required of much smaller units. Leaders at every level will be further removed from
their superiors, and will be expected to know the commander’s intent and to take
the actions required to further mission accomplishment. They “must know ‘how
to think’ versus ‘what to think.’”36 Leaders of this type are developed throughout
a career, not through unit training alone. This will require reexamining leader development programs from the Basic Noncommissioned Officer Course through
the Sergeants Major Academy; from the Officers Basic Course through Senior
Service Colleges; and within individual units. Furthermore, developing this new
type of leader may require more time. Objective Force leaders will require increased maturity, thoughtfulness, and ability to act appropriately without explicit
orders or guidance. If we think of leader development as the instilling of characteristics a leader should have (as opposed to technical skills, which fall into the
domain of training), then leader development for both transformation and homeland security appears to be quite similar.
The material requirements of the Objective Force are significant. If it
comes into being as currently envisioned, it will require multiple technologies that
are still in the R&D process to mature quickly. In addition to significantly lighter
armor and more capable intelligence and communications platforms, current versions of Objective Force draft doctrine and plans envision significant numbers of
very capable robots, significantly greater levels of lethality and survivability with
less size and weight, and organic intra-theater vertical lift transport capable of
moving large formations equipped with the Future Combat System. Projected
funding requirements for this collection of technologies and capabilities far exceed projected budgets. This could have implications for resources and facilities
across the board (as well as on every other aspect of DOTMLPF), but should not
otherwise negatively affect the homeland security mission.
Personnel support functions are of great importance in the transformed
force. The drastically increased optempo and nonlinear battlefield of the future
create a situation so stressful, both psychologically and physically, that methods
for supporting soldiers (and their families) must be seriously studied. Little has
been published on this to date, but it, too, seems to be an area in which the demands of the transformed force and homeland security could be harmonious.
Finally, family support issues will likely be of increased importance to the reserve components in both the transformed and homeland security missions.

Recommendations
The Objective Force White Paper states, “The Objective Force will require higher levels of integration between the active and reserve components to
the point of truly being The Army, not three separate components. This has to
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be accomplished in order to achieve strategic responsiveness and dominance
across the spectrum of military operations and to simultaneously provide for
homeland security.”37
The foregoing discussions make clear that there are significant and
problematic implications with this statement. The demands of homeland security
and transformation may in many cases force specialization upon the components, rather than increase cooperation. Indeed, logic and such prestigious bodies
as the Gilmore Commission urge this approach. Yet a first-order perspective on
these issues brings us to a logically simple, yet logistically difficult conclusion.
Military transformation, in its essence, should be the act of changing
the shape and functions of the military to meet the challenges of the future security environment. As originally foreseen, this involves using advances in technology to make possible heretofore unheard-of capabilities for fighting enemies
on future battlefields. It is now clear that a critical component of future security
situations will be homeland security. The transformation process must be rethought in this context. Transformation must explicitly include the demands of
homeland security as a key component so that all DOTMLPF implications are examined holistically and the transformed force can accomplish all missions assigned to it by the nation’s leadership in the envisioned security environment.
Some simple observations and conclusions, organized along the
DOTMLPF categories, make it clear that a holistic approach is needed. They include these:
l Doctrinal changes for homeland security and transformation will appear mutually exclusive at face value, but will have significant implications for
training, leader development, organization, and personnel support that affect
both missions.
l The training burdens of transformation and homeland security may
be significantly different and to some extent divergent. Reserve component
units, with limited available time, will find it difficult if not impossible to train
well for both missions, making it necessary to seriously consider designating
separate units for homeland security missions and warfighting.
l Leader development demands of homeland security and transformation will appear different in form, but may be substantially similar in character.
Both will place a premium on intellectual capability, maturity, and the ability to
act appropriately without explicit direction.
l The training demands outlined above; the needs of governors for
trained, well-led, and appropriately organized forces to defend against terrorist
threats; and possible political pressures not to deploy some ARNG units during
times of heightened terrorist threats will demand a fundamental reexamination of
Army organization. End-strength levels may also be affected.
l Materiel development and facilities requirements will not be significantly affected by the homeland security/transformation divergence.
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l Personnel—in this case primarily soldier and family support issues—
will be of increased importance in both the homeland security and transformation
frameworks, and require a focused examination to determine needs.
NOTES
1. US Army White Paper, “Concepts of the Objective Force,” http://www.objectiveforce.army.mil/pages/
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made reference to the chains of Pacific islands as the perimeter of our national defense, with the clear implication that control of them would prevent future enemies from invading the United States.
4. See, for example, Jeremy Feiler, “National Guard Association: Governors Should Control Deployments,” Inside the Pentagon, 10 October 2002, p.1. Also, note that there has been a tremendous amount of focus
on the programmatic and budget implications of transformation, but this has been on financial and defense industrial base issues, not on issues of structure to perform these competing strategic functions.
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32. Several elements of doctrine have been developed that begin to address the needs of the Objective
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